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Abstract 
Earnings  and  labour  market  participation  in urban  areas  of Bolivia  are  analyzed,  using 
household  level  survey  data  from  1989.  We  distinguish  between  non-participation, 
formal  sector  work,  and  informal  sector  work,  and  estimate  separate  wage  equations  for 
informal  and  formal  sector.  Two  types  of  models  are  analyzed:  in  the  first,  the  informal 
sector  is seen  as  a buffer  zone  between  formal  sector  and  non-participation,  while  in  the 
second,  there  is  no  ordering  among  sectors.  We  find  that  accounting  for  selectivity 
substantially  affects  wage  equation  estimates.  The  direction  of  the  selectivity  effect  is the 
same  according  to  both  models,  but  its  magnitude  varies,  in  particular  for  the  informal 
sector.  Other  results  are  quite  robust:  wages  are  higher  in  larger  local  labour  markets.  In 
both  sectors  females  of  ethnic  minorities  are  underpaid. 
Keywords:  Employment;  Segmented  labor  markets 
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1.  Introduction 
This  paper  analyzes  earnings  and  labour  market  participation  in  urban  areas 
in  Bolivia,  using  household  survey  data  from  1989.  Three  labour  market  states 
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are  distinguished:  not  working,  working  in  the  informal  sector,  and  working  in 
the  formal  sector.  We  analyze  the  determinants  of  potential  earnings  in  both 
sectors,  considering,  for  example,  returns  to education  and  effects  of local  labour 
market  conditions.  Moreover,  we analyze  participation.  What  factors  determine 
whether  an  individual  works  in  the  formal  or  informal  sector?  Are  the  two 
sectors  competitive  and  is the  difference  between  potential  earnings  sufficient  to 
explain  the  sector  someone  is  in?  Or  do  other  factors  matter,  such  as  (non- 
monetary)  sector  preferences  or  barriers  to  entry? 
The  distinction  formal/informal  has  become  the  standard  way  to  characterize 
urban  labour  markets  in  developing  countries.  The  formal  sector  is  subject  to 
regulation,  wages  are  paid  on  a  regular  basis,  taxes  are  levied  and  explicit 
contracts  between  employers  and  workers  exist.  The  informal  sector  is  not 
subject  to  government  regulation  and  is  dominated  by  one  person  firms  and 
small  enterprises  that  employ  few  apprentices  or  hired  labourers.  The  exact 
definition  is  arbitrary  to  some  extent  and  depends  on  the  specific  research 
objectives  (Hart,  1985).  The  IL0  mission  to  Kenya  in  1972  (Lubell,  1990) 
defined  economic  informality  in  a  broad  context  using  characteristics  such 
as  ease  of  entry,  small  scale  of  operation,  family  ownership,  skills  acquired 
outside  the  formal  school  system,  and  unregulated  and  more  competitive 
markets. 
Models  analyzing  labour  market  segmentation  and  returns  to  human  capital 
in  a  two-sector  framework,  have  been  used  extensively.  See,  e.g.,  Hartog  and 
Oosterbeek  (1993)  for  a  developed  country  and  Van  der  Gaag  and  Vijverberg 
(1988)  for  a  developing  country.  For  three  labour  market  states,  however,  no 
established  approach  exists.  Two  approaches  can  be  distinguished.  In  the  first 
the  informal  sector  is viewed  as an  intermediary  sector  between  not  working  and 
the  formal  sector.  This  stems  from  the  traditional  staging  hypothesis  in,  for 
example,  the  pioneering  work  of  Fields  (1975):  formal  sector  employment  is 
rationed  and  all  informal  sector  workers  would  be  better  of in  a  formal  sector 
job.  Recent  empirical  evidence,  however,  shows  that  many  informal  sector 
workers  favour  their  current  status  to  formal  sector  employment  (Thomas, 
1992).  In  the  second  approach,  competitive  markets  are  assumed  and  the  two 
sectors  are  treated  symmetrically.  Examples  are  Magnac  (1991),  who  tests  for 
labour  market  segmentation  in  Columbia,  and  Gindling  (1991),  analyzing  urban 
labour  markets  in  Costa  Rica. 
We  consider  both  types  of  models  and  pay  attention  to  the  sensitivity  of  the 
results  for  the  choice  of  model.  In  particular,  estimated  wage  equations  may 
differ,  because  the  models  lead  to  different  corrections  for  selection  bias  (Heck- 
man  and  Hotz,  1986).  We  choose  between  models  on  the  basis  of  specification 
tests. 
The  organization  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  In  Section  2  we  provide 
some  background  information  regarding  the  Bolivian  economy  and  institu- 
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Results  are  discussed  and  evaluated  in  Section  4. Conclusions  are  mentioned  in 
Section  5. 
2.  Economic  background  and  data 
To  understand  the  role  of  the  informal  sector  in  Bolivia,  some  background 
information  is  useful.  The  Bolivian  economy  deteriorated  rapidly  from  1978  to 
1985.  In  1985,  the  annual  inflation  rates  reached  12,000  percent  (ILO,  1991)  and 
GDP  growth  rates  had  been  negative  for  five  consecutive  years.  Open  unem- 
ployment  increased  from  9.7 percent  in  1981  to  18.0 percent  in  1985  (ILO,  1991; 
persons  aged  10  years  and  over).  The  government  that  took  power  in  1985 
reacted  to  the  situation  with  a  ‘New  Economic  Policy’,  to  stabilize  prices  and 
reduce  the  role  of  the  state.  Policy  measures  included  devaluation  of  the  local 
currency,  reduction  of  government  expenditures,  and  a  far  reaching  markets 
liberalization  program.  Prices  and  interest  rates  were  freed  and  public  sector 
wages  were  renegotiated.  The  policy  of  stabilizing  prices  was  successful:  from 
1986  to  1989,  consumer  prices  increased  by  only  16 percent  per  year.  Economic 
growth  however,  failed  to  pick  up.  It  reached  2.5  percent  in  the  years  1986  to 
1989,  less  than  the  growth  in  population.  The  unemployment  rate  hardly 
changed  (19.0  percent  in  1990). 
During  the  economic  slowdown  between  1976  and  1987,  the  size  of  the 
informal  sector  in  urban  areas  grew  from  43  to  55  percent  of  the  labour 
force  (Velasco  et  al.,  1989).  There  was  a  sharp  rise  just  after  the  reforms: 
from  1985  to  1986,  urban  formal  sector  employment  fell  by  62,209  jobs,  i.e.  14 
percent.  In  the  same  year  the  informal  sector  grew  with  116,704  people 
(UDAPE,  1991). This  supports  the  view  of the  informal  sector  as a buffer  sector. 
Income  generated  from  the  informal  sector  is  needed  in  a  period  of  economic 
recession. 
Labour  market  regulation  mainly  affects  the  formal  sector.  In  1985,  various 
labour  regulations  were  abolished.  Policy  aimed  at  re-enforcing  market  powers 
in  the  labour  market,  establishing  a closer  link  between  work  effort  and  pay.  The 
policy  change  allowed  for  wage  negotiations  at  firm  level  instead  of sector  level, 
eased  hiring  and  firing  of  employees,  and  abolished  most  bonuses  (such  as 
subsidized  food  stores)  for  public  sector  workers.  Minimum  wage  laws  were 
maintained.  In  1989,  the  minimum  monthly  wage  was  Bs  60.  ’  It  is  mostly 
offered  to  unskilled  public  sector  workers.  Social  security  is  compulsory  for 
formal  sector  firms  and  workers.  It  covers  health  and  disability  insurance  and 
old  age  pension. 
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2.1.  Data 
We use the  second  round  of the  Bolivian  household  survey  (Encuesta  Integ- 
rada  de  Hogares),  drawn  in  1989.  This  is  a  random  sample  of  the  urban 
population,  administered  yearly  by  the  Bolivian  National  Bureau  of Statistics 
(Instituto  National  de Estadistica),  with assistance  of the World  Bank. The  1989 
survey  covers  7264 households  in 8 urban  centers.  Household  survey  data  are 
more  appropriate  than  firm  level  data  for  measuring  activity  in  the  informal 
sector,  since the  latter  often  do  not  include  information  on  non-listed  firms  or 
micro-enterprises,  the  bulk  of  the  informal  sector.  We  distinguish  between 
formal  and  informal  sector  on  the  basis  of worker  status.  See Appendix  A for 
a discussion  and  for details  on  the  construction  of the  data  base, definitions  of 
the variables,  and  sample  statistics.  Samples  used for estimation  consist  of 6349 
males  and  7293 females  from  19 to  65 years  of age. 
Hourly  earnings  are  higher  for  males  than  for females.  On  average,  informal 
earnings  are higher  than  formal  earnings.  For  females in particular,  the variance 
of hourly  earnings  is much  larger  in the informal  than  in the formal  sector.  This 
corresponds  to the notion  that  the informal  sector  is very heterogeneous  (Fields, 
1990). For  both  sexes, average  hours  worked  in the informal  sector  exceed  those 
in the  formal  sector. 
Because  of measurement  problems,  reported  hourly  earnings  may  underesti- 
mate  the benefits  of formal  sector jobs  compared  to informal  sector jobs.  Fringe 
benefits  are  not  included  in reported  formal  sector  wages.  57 percent  of males 
and 72 percent  of females working  in the formal  sector,  reported  to have received 
benefits  other  than  the  regular  wage.  The  survey  does  not  collect  a monetary 
equivalent  for these. 48 percent  of males  and  64 percent  of females  in the formal 
sector  are  enrolled  in social  security,  the  costs  of which  are  partly  born  by the 
employer.  Income  taxes  hardly  play  a role: in 1989, they  represented  3.3 percent 
of total  tax  revenues  (World  Bank,  1989). The  bulk  of government  revenues  is 
collected  trough  value  added  taxes.  Informal  sector  earnings  may  not  always  be 
measured  net  of  costs.  The  questionnaire  does  not  contain  enough  detail  to 
correct  for this. This  type  of problems  may  affect  estimates  of wage differentials 
between  the  two  sectors,  but  will not  affect  the  estimates  of the  (reduced  form) 
sector  allocation  equations. 
Another  point  of concern  is the  extent  to  which  the  data  are  representative. 
Obviously,  rural  areas  are  not  represented,  so that  the  data  cannot  be used  to 
analyze  migration  from  rural  to  urban  areas  and  the  choice  between  employ- 
ment  in the  agricultural  or  the  urban  sectors,  the  issues in the early  theoretical 
models  [Fields  (1975) for example].  Because  rural  areas  are not  represented,  the 
survey  data  deviate  substantially  from  official  nationwide  statistics  in  some 
respects.  For  example,  activity  rates  (the fraction  of people  working  or  looking 
for  work),  amount  to  84 percent  for  males  and  51 percent  of  females  in  the 
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3.  Models 
The  main  objective  of  the  paper  is  to  analyze  factors  driving  participation, 
sector  choice  and  earnings  in  the  formal  and  informal  sector.  The  models  consist 
of  two  wage  equations,  one  for  each  sector,  and  two  reduced  form  equations 
explaining  the  selection  mechanism.  They  differ  with  respect  to  the  latter.  The 
number  of  hours  worked  is  not  considered.  Wages  are  hourly  wage  rates, 
obtained  by  dividing  total  earnings  by  number  of  hours  worked. 
In  the  first  model,  the  choice  between  working  in  the  formal  sector,  working 
in  the  informal  sector,  and  non-participation,  is  modelled  using  ordered 
probit.  In  the  second  model,  multinomial  logit  is  used.  The  selection  equations 
are  in  reduced  form,  in  the  sense  that  the  wage  rate  is  not  included  as 
an  explanatory  variable.  Wage  effects  are  thus  indirectly  reflected  through, 
for  example,  age  and  education  effects.  The  model  is  also  reduced  form  in  the 
sense  that  we  consider  someone’s  actual  state  only.  Information  on  preferred 
labour  market  state  or  job  search  is  not  taken  into  account.  We  do  not 
disentangle  effects  through  preferences  from  those  through  rationing,  costs  of 
search,  etc. 
3.1.  Ordered  probit  selection  model 
In  the  first  model,  the  three  labour  market  states  are  ordered:  participation  in 
the  formal  sector  -  participation  in  the  informal  sector  -  non-participation.  An 
underlying  latent  variable  can  be  interpreted  as  an  indicator  of  formality. 
Non-participation  includes  being  engaged  in  household  production  which  is 
associated  with  the  lowest  level  of  formality. 
We  do  not  explicitly  specify  an  underlying  structural  economic  model  leading 
to  this  ordering.  The  economic  interpretation  is  the  staging  hypothesis  of  the 
Fields  (1975)  model:  informal  sector  employment  is  inferior  to  formal  sector 
employment;  informal  sector  earnings  exceed  unemployment  income.  In 
equilibrium,  a  move  from  unemployment  to  the  informal  sector  involves  an 
increase  in  earnings  at  the  cost  of  a  reduced  efficiency  of  search.  In  this 
view,  economic  formality  is  associated  with  increasing  economic  activity  and 
a decreasing  search  effort  [see  also  Todaro  (1989,  p. 268)].  In  a dynamic  setting, 
new  labour  market  participants  or  immigrants  from  rural  areas  would  first 
accept  a  job  in  the  informal  sector,  and  simultaneously  look  for  formal 
sector  work. 
The  formal  representation  of  the  model  is: 
Y<  c1,  if  working  in  formal  sector, 
Y =  Z6,  +  E3  cc,  <  Y<G12  if  working  in  informal  sector, 
ciz<  Y  if  non-participant. 
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The  subscript  indicating  the  individual  is  suppressed.  Y is  the  latent  variable, 
the  inverse  of  the  ‘degree  of  formality’.  s3 -  N(0,  l),  independent  of  2.  2  is 
a  vector  of  individual,  family,  and  regional  characteristics.  Since  the  system  is 
reduced  form  (wage  rates  are  eliminated),  Z  contains  all  variables  in  the  wage 
equations.  In  addition,  Z  contains  taste  shifters  that  do  not  result  from  potential 
earnings  differences.  By  means  of  normalization,  Z  contains  no  constant 
term. 
In  the  standard  version  of  the  model  stated  above,  a,  and  CI~  are  constant 
across  the  sample.  Identification  requires  only  one  of  them  to  be  constant, 
however.  Keeping  the  other  u  constant  limits  model  flexibility:  choice 
probabilities  depend  on  Z  through  the  one  index  Z6r  only;  the  probability 
of  informal  sector  employment  would  depend  on  Z  only  through  the 
non-linearity  of  the  distribution  function  of  e3.  This  is  a  general  drawback 
of  the  standard  ordered  probit  model.  To  allow  for  more  flexibility,  we  para- 
metrize  tx2: 
a2(Z) = al  +  exp(Z&).  (2) 
According  to  (1)  and  (2)  the  probability  of  formal  sector  employment  is 
determined  by  Z6i  only,  but  the  choice  between  informal  employment  and 
non-participation  depends  on  both  Z6,  and  Z&.  Incorporating  the  exponential 
term  in  al(Z)  guarantees  t12 >  tli. 
3.2.  Multinomial  logit selection  model 
In  the  second  model,  no  a priori  ordering  among  the  three  states  is assumed. 
The  model  can  be  interpreted  in  terms  of  utility  maximization.  Let  Yi be  the 
indirect  utility  associated  with  participation  in  sector  i. We  assume: 
Yi =  Z6i  +  ‘li 
max{  Y,,  Y,,  Y,}  =  Y,  if  working  in  formal  sector, 
max{  Yi,  Y,,  Y3} =  Yz  if  working  in  informal  sector,  (3) 
maxi  Y,,  Yz, Y,}  =  Y3  if  non-participant. 
Here  ni -  EV(1) (an  extreme  value  type  I distribution),  and  ql,  n2, q3 indepen- 
dent.  Z  is  the  same  as  in  the  ordered  probit  model.  Alternative  i  is  chosen 
if  its  utility  exceeds  that  of  all  other  alternatives.  Of  course,  since  actual 
and  preferred  state  do  not  necessarily  coincide,  the  interpretation  of  utility 
maximization  should  not  be  taken  literally.  If someone  prefers  but  cannot  find 
a  formal  sector  job,  Y1  will  be  small.  Thus  Yi  reflects  both  rationing  and 
preferences. 
Normalization  requires  one  6, to  be  constant  (we  choose  6,  =  0).  Define 
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Domencich  and  McFadden  (1975)  show  that  the  probability  of being  in  state 
i equals 
Pi  =  prob($  <  Z6i)  =  Fi(Z6i)  = 
exp  tzsi) 
C  j=  1,2,3exP(Z@’ 
Here  Fi  is  the  distribution  function  of  vi*,  which  depends  on  Z6j,  j  #  i. 
3.3.  Wage  equations 
The  natural  logarithm  of  the  potential  hourly 
modeled  as 
wage  rate  Wi  in  sector  i  is 
IIl(WJ  =  XiBi  +  &i,  i =  l(formal),  Z(informal).  (6) 
X  contains  explanatory  variables:  personal  characteristics  (human  capital 
variables),  and  variables  describing  the  condition  of the  labour  market  by  urban 
area.  Ei is  a  normally  distributed  error  term. 
3.4.  Error  structure 
In  the  ordered  probit  case,  the  three  error  terms  si,  s2  and  s3  are  assumed 
to  be  jointly  normally  distributed  with  zero  mean  and  a  full  covariance 
matrix.  The  covariance  of .sl and  I+ is not  identified,  since  we  observe  one  wage 
at  most. 
In  the  multinomial  logit  case,  we  follow  Lee  (1982)  [see  also  Maddala  (1983, 
p.  273)].  Let 
E:i =  ~-‘Fi(rli*)  =  Ji(Qy.  (7) 
Here  @-  ’ is the  inverse  of the  standard  normal  distribution  function.  (7) implies 
that  s:i  m  N(0,  1).  Alternative  i  is  chosen  if  szi <  Ji(Z6i).  We  assume  that,  for 
i =  1,2,  (si,sTi),  is  bivariate  normal  with  mean  (0,O)  and  covariance  matrix  Ci, 
with  x,(2,2)  =  1. These  assumptions  make  it  convenient  to  estimate  the  multi- 
nomial  logit  model  and  wage  equations  with  a  two-step  method  or  maximum 
likelihood. 
3.5.  IdentiJication 
Both  models  are  generalizations  of two-sector  self-selection  models,  of which 
the  model  of  Roy  (1951)  is  the  seminal  example.  Identification  of  this  type  of 
models  is  discussed  in  Heckman  and  Honor6  (1990)  and  Heckman  (1990). 
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First,  the  complete  model  is identified  under  the  specific  distributional  as- 
sumptions  on the errors,  even without  exclusion  restrictions  on the regressors  in 
one  or  more  of  the  equations.  This  changes  if distributional  assumptions  are 
relaxed  and  replaced  by,  for  instance,  the  semiparametric  assumptions  of 
independence  of  errors  from  regressors  and  zero  error  means  or  medians. 
For  this  case, Heckman  (1990, p. 314) proves  identification  under  the  assump- 
tion  that  at least  one  of the regressors  in the  selection  part  is excluded  from  the 
wage  equations.  This  condition  is satisfied  in  our  case:  Z  contains  variables 
referring  to  family  composition  and  other  family  income,  not  included  in X. In 
practice,  whether  results  depend  on  distributional  assumptions,  may  thus  de- 
pend  on  the  explanatory  power  of  the  additional  regressors  in  the  selection 
equations. 
Moreover,  semiparametric  estimation  of  the  constant  terms  in  the  wage 
equations  is harder  than  estimating  slope  coefficients.  Semiparametric  identi- 
fication  of  the  constant  term  in,  say,  the  wage  equation  of  sector  1, relies 
on  the  assumption  that  a  nonzero  population  fraction  has  a  probability 
close  to  one  of being  selected  into  sector  1. As a consequence,  semiparametric 
estimates  of  the  constant  term  would  be  inaccurate  if few observations  have 
selection  probability  close  to  one.  In  other  words,  parametric  estimates  of 
constant  terms  may  be  particularly  sensitive  for  the  choice  of  distributional 
assumptions. 
3.6.  Net  dissavings 
To  allow for an income  effect on labour  supply,  some measure  for full income 
or income  excluding  earnings  is included  in Z. For  consistency  with a life cycle 
framework  (Blundell  and  Walker,  1986), the  measure  should  be  corrected  for 
savings:  in  a  two-stage  budgeting  framework,  the  within-period  allocation  of 
leisure  and  consumption  is conditional  on full expenditures  in the same  period, 
or, equivalently,  on net  dissavings,  defined  as consumption  expenditures  minus 
earnings.  We use  net  dissavings  per  capita,  assuming  that  the  household’s  net 
dissavings  are shared  equally  among  family  members.  In this theoretical  frame- 
work,  net  dissavings  may  be  treated  as  an  exogenous  variable.  However,  if 
unobservable  factors  affect net savings and labour  supply,  treating  net savings as 
exogenous  leads  to  biased  results.  We  therefore  have  instrumented  for  net 
savings.  Non-labour  income  is the  main  instrument.  Details  are  described  in 
Appendix  B. 
3.7.  Estimation 
If Z, including  net  dissavings,  is exogenous,  the  models  can  be estimated  by 
full information  maximum  likelihood,  or  with  a consistent  two-step  estimator. 
The  latter  can  be used  to  obtain  starting  values  for  maximizing  the  likelihood. M.  Pradhan,  A.  van Soest  1 Labour  Economics  2  (I99.5)  275-297  283 
Differences  between  the  two  sets of estimates  can  be used  to  carry  out  a Haus- 
man  test  for  model  misspecification.  Details  on both  estimators  are  mentioned 
in a technical  appendix,  available  upon  request  from  the  authors. 
Allowing  for endogeneity  of net  dissavings  as described  in Appendix  B, does 
not  substantially  complicate  the  estimation.  In  an  auxiliary  first  OLS  step,  an 
equation  explaining  net dissavings  is estimated.  OLS  residuals  are then  added  to 
the  systematic  parts  of the  selection  equations.  Non-zero  coefficients  of  these 
residuals  indicate  endogeneity.  See Appendix  B. Standard  errors  of  ML  have 
been corrected  for the uncertainty  in the first step estimates  using Newey  (1984). 
4.  Estimation  results 
Tables  with detailed  estimation  results  of two-step  and ML estimations,  are in 
the  technical  appendix,  available  upon  request.  The  following  discussion  is 
based  on  the,  more  efficient,  ML  results2 
4.1.  Wage  equations 
In Table  1 we present  estimates  for the  wage equations.  The  estimates  of the 
age  pattern  and  the  constant  term  in  the  informal  sector  are  sensitive  to  the 
choice  of selection  model.  For  most  other  explanatory  variables  the  estimated 
coefficients  in both  models  are  comparable  in sign and  significance. 
The  coefficients  on  the  age  variables  (age)  are  significant  (at  5 percent  level) 
only for females in the formal  sector.  A maximum  is reached  at about  46 years  of 
age.  Females  in  ethnic  minorities  are  significantly  underpaid  in  both  sectors 
according  to  both  models.  For  males,  the  signs are  the  same,  but  significance 
levels are  lower. 
The  variables  econ  act (economic  activity)  and  unemployment  describe  local 
labour  markets  conditions.  The effect of econ act, which is used as a proxy  for the 
size of the local  labour  market,  is positive  and  significant  in all cases. The  local 
unemployment  rate  has a negative  effect on earnings,  and  the effect is largest  in 
the  informal  sector.  This  suggests  that  the  informal  sector  is more  competitive, 
and  that  less  favourable  labour  market  conditions  have  a  greater  negative 
impact  on  earnings  in the  informal  than  in the  formal  sector. 
Table  1 also  contains  estimates  of the  error  variances  of the  wage equations 
and  of error  covariances  between  wage  and  selection  equations.  The  informal 
‘The  terminology  in  the  sequel  ignores  the  preliminary  step  instrumenting  for  per  capita  net 
dissavings.  The  two  step  estimator  thus  is  actually  a  three  step  estimator.  Similarly,  what  we  call 
maximum  likelihood  is  not  ML  of  the  full  model,  but  the  two  step  estimator  with  OLS  in  the  first 
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sector  wage  variance  is  larger  than  that  of  the  formal  sector  wage.  This  corres- 
ponds  to  the  notion  that  the  formal  sector  is more  regulated,  leading  to  a smaller 
earnings  dispersion.  The  covariances  determine  the  differences  between  the 
potential  wage  distribution  for  the  whole  population,  and  the  actual  wage 
distribution  among  those  selected  in  the  sector  concerned.  It  is the  latter  which  is 
reflected  in  the  sample,  and  the  former  which  we  try  to  analyze.  For  males,  the 
positive  coefficients  for  the  formal  sector  imply  negative  selectivity  effects.  This  is 
not  what  one  would  expect.  For  males  in  the  informal  sector,  the  selectivity 
effects  are  positive  according  to  both  models.3  This  means  that,  for  given 
observed  characteristics,  those  with  highest  unobserved  informal  sector  skills 
indeed  work  in  the  informal  sector.  For  females,  the  multinomial  logit  model 
leads  to  exactly  the  opposite  results:  the  selection  effect  is positive  for  the  formal, 
and  negative  for  the  informal  sector.  The  difference  between  the  two  models 
seems  substantial  here:  according  to  the  multinomial  logit  model,  the  selectivity 
effects  are  much  stronger  than  according  to  the  ordered  probit  model.  The 
correlation  coefficients  for  the  informal  sector  are  surprisingly  high,  explaining 
the  huge  selection  effects,  particularly  in  the  multinomial  logit  model. 
Education  level  is incorporated  as follows.  First,  dummies  are  used  to  indicate 
the  highest  level  of courses  attended.  Seven  levels  are  distinguished.  Second,  for 
those  who  did  not  complete  the  course,  we  used  the  deviation  between  the  level 
attained  and  the  level  if completed,  expressed  in  years.  This  deviation  is zero  if 
the  course  is finished  and  negative  otherwise.  Those  who  followed  training  that 
was  not  classified,  are  included  in  the  estimation.  For  them,  the  dummy  variable 
other is set  to  one  and  yrs incompl educ (years  of incomplete  education)  to  zero. 
For  a discussion  of the  effect  of education  on  the  wage  offers  we turn  to  Table 
2. For  each  level  of (completed)  education,  we  have  calculated  the  predicted  log 
wage.  For  the  formal  sector,  the  wage  pattern  as  a function  of education  level  is 
robust  with  respect  to  the  chosen  model.  The  relative  increase  in  wage  offer  from 
lowest  (basic) to  highest  (uniu)  ( =  university)  type  of education  is 0.84  for  males 
and  1.34  for  females.  For  the  informal  sector  the  estimates  vary  substantially 
with  the  choice  of the  selection  model.  In  particular,  the  estimated  average  wage 
levels  are  quite  different  according  to  the  two  models.  This  may  be  explained  by 
the  problems  with  semiparametric  identification  of  the  constant  term  (cf.  the 
discussion  in  Section  3). Returns  to  education  are  lower  in  the  informal  sector 
than  in  the  formal  sector,  as  we  would  expect  under  the  segmented  labour 
market  hypothesis. 
Figure  1 shows  the  estimated  population  distribution  of potential  earnings  in 
both  sectors  according  to  both  models.  There  is  substantial  overlap  in  the 
distribution  of  earnings  in  informal  and  formal  sector,  caused  by  variation  in 
3Because  the  probability  of  non-participation  is  small  for  males,  this  statement  is  valid  for  the 
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Table  2 




years  of 
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Males 
Ord  probit  Mult  logit 
Females 































0.638  0.603  -  0.300 
(0.048)  (0.047)  (0.144) 
0.720  0.685  -  0.080 
(0.052)  (0.050)  (0.137) 
0.883  0.851  0.223 
(0.042)  (0.040)  (0.110) 
1.078  1.044  0.513 
(0.078)  (0.076)  (0.100) 
1.220  1.186  0.729 
(0.097)  (0.095)  (0.124) 
0.717  0.709  0.672 
(0.079)  (0.076)  (0.059) 
1.465  1.457  1.012 
(0.046)  (0.044)  (0.072) 
-  0.142  -  0.677  0.099  0.828 
(0.067)  (0.083)  (0.069)  (0.099) 
-  0.090  -  0.600  0.356  1.104 
(0.073)  (0.091)  (0.08 1)  (0.107) 
0.142  -  0.473  0.460  1.357 
(0.060)  (0.084)  (0.070)  (0.111) 
0.234  -  0.462  0.666  1.830 
(0.138)  (0.150)  (0.119)  (0.164) 
0.229  -  0.534  0.912  2.204 
(0.170)  (0.178)  (0.242)  (0.271) 
-  0.561  -  1.287  0.224  2.036 
(0.178)  (0.190)  (0.166)  (0.203) 
0.458  -  0.450  0.817  2.236 
(0.092)  (0.124)  (0.119)  (0.178) 
-  0.390 
(0.130) 










0.98  1 
(0.069) 
a Standard  errors  in  parentheses 
observed  and  unobserved  characteristics.  For  males,  formal  sector  wages  are  on 
average  higher  than  informal  sector  wages.  Examining  the  expected  wage  offer 
(not  accounting  for  the  unobserved  characteristics)  for  all  individuals  separately, 
one  finds  that  for  all  males  in  the  sample  the  expected  wage  in  the  formal  sector 
exceeds  that  in  the  informal  sector,  according  to  both  models.  In  this  respect,  the 
distribution  in  the  whole  population  differs  from  the  distributions  in  the  selected M.  Pradhan.  A.  van  Soest  1 Labour  Economics  2  (199-T)  275-297  281 
a 
Fig.  1. Estimated  distribution  of  wage  offers. 
Note:  Wage  offers  include  random  draws  of  the  error  terms.  Smoothing  is  done  using  a  Gaussian 
kernel  with  the  normal  reference  rule  bandwidth. 
subpopulations.  In  particular,  the  selection  effect  in  the  informal  sector  is quite 
strong:  only  those  with  relatively  high  potential  informal  sector  earnings  will 
indeed  work  in  the  informal  sector.  This  is why  the  sample  average  of earnings  of 
informal  sector  workers,  exceeds  that  of  formal  sector  earnings.  This  finding 
yields  some  support  for  the  Fields  (1975)  model:  on  average,  males  would  be 
better  of  in  the  formal  sector. 
For  females  however,  we  find  opposite  results.  According  to  the  multinomial 
logit  model,  expected  earnings  are  higher  in  the  informal  sector  for  all  females  in 
the  sample.  Using  ordered  probit,  we  find  that  for  9 percent  of  the  sample  the 
predicted  wage  offer  in  the  formal  sector  is higher.  These  are  exclusively  females 
with  normal  (mainly  teachers)  or  university  training.  These  results  indicate  that 
we  cannot  explain  sector  participation  on  the  basis  of  expected  wages  and 
restrictions  to  entry  in  the  formal  sector  only.  Account  must  be  taken  of 
differences  in  preferences  for  the  two  sectors. 288  M.  Pradhan.  A.  van  Soest  /  Labour  Economics  2  (1995)  275-297 
4.2.  Selection  equations 
Interpreting  separate  parameter  estimates  in  the  selection  equations  is  not 
very  useful.  Human  capital  variables  appear  in  various  ways  (age  and  age 
square,  for  example),  and  selection  probabilities  are  often  determined  by  more 
than  one  linear  combination  of the  regressors.  In  Table  3, we  therefore  present 
effects  of marginal  changes  of some  of the  characteristics  on  the  state  probabilit- 
ies,  for  the  average  male  and  female.  Signs  and  significance  levels  of  the  effects 
according  to  the  two  models  are  similar  in  most  cases. 
The  effect  of family  composition  is captured  trough  young,  prime and  old. The 
presence  of young  children  in  the  household  (young)  significantly  decreases  the 
probability  that  the  female  works  in  the  formal  sector,  and  increases  her 
probability  of  non-participation.  The  presence  of  other  prime  age  individuals 
(prime) implies  that  the  male  or  female  concerned  may  not  be  the  main  earner  in 
the  household.  This  significantly  reduces  the  female’s  informal  employment 
probability,  and  increases  her  probability  of non-participation.  The  latter  is also 
true  for  males,  at  the  cost  of  the  formal  employment  probability.  A  negative 
impact  of prime  on  participation  was  expected.  It  is  not  clear  why  prime  affects 
the  choice  between  formal  and  informal  employment.  The  presence  of  family 
members  older  than  65 (old) is significant  in  one  case  only:  It  increases  the  male’s 
probability  of  informal  employment. 
Individual  characteristics  are  married,  age  and  ethnic.  For  females,  being 
married  strongly  and  significantly  reduces  employment  probabilities  in  both 
sectors.  For  males,  being  married  reduces  the  probability  of  non-participation 
and  increases  that  of  formal  sector  employment.  The  probability  of  informal 
employment  increases  significantly  with  age  for  both  males  and  females.  In 
return,  the  female’s  probability  of  not  participating  decreases  with  age,  and  so 
does  the  male’s  probability  of  formal  employment.  This  may  reflect  a  cohort 
effect  rather  than  a  pure  age  effect.  Since  we  included  age  and  age  square, 
marginal  effects  at  other  age  levels  may  be  different.  Note  that  age  effects  are 
a combination  of direct  and  indirect  effects:  they  include  those  through  the  wage 
rate.  For  ethnic  minorities  (ethnic  =  l),  the  probability  of informal  employment 
is significantly  larger  than  for  others.  For  males,  this  must  be  a direct  effect  since 
ethnic  hardly  affects  wages.  The  relative  magnitude  of  the  effect  alters  with  the 
model  chosen. 
Education  level  enters  through  various  variables,  and  it  is  not  possible  to 
present  a  single  partial  derivative.  Effects  of  education  on  the  participation 
probabilities  according  to  the  two  models  are  virtually  identical.  In  general, 
they  are  as  expected:  probabilities  of formal  and  informal  employment  increase 
and  decrease  with  education  level,  respectively.  We  find  a  strong  positive 
impact  of ‘normal’  training  (normal) on  the  formal  employment  probability.  This 
type  of education  includes  teachers  training  college,  typically  used  in  the  formal 
sector. Table  3 
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Predicted  partial  derivatives  of  probability  of  participation  for  an  average  individual  for  ordered 
probit  and  multinomial  logit  selection  model” 
Males 
Formal  Informal  Not 
working 
Females 
Formal  Informal  Not 
working 





netdissati  pc/lOOO 
age*100 
econ  act/IO 
unemployment*lO 
ethnic 





netdissav  pc/lOOO 
age*  100 
econ  active/l0 
unemployment*  10 
ethnic 
-  0.005 
(0.004) 
-  0.012* 
(0.003) 




-  0.624* 
(0.176) 
-  0.478* 
(0.070) 
-  0.007 
(0.011) 
-  0.005 
(0.041) 
-  0.062* 
(0.014) 
-  0.003 
(0.004) 
-  0.015* 
(0.003) 




-  0.703* 
(0.185) 
-  0.585* 
(0.073) 
































































-  0.006 
(0.011) 












-  0.009* 
(0.003) 
-  0.002 
(0.003) 
-  0.0075 
(0.012) 
-  0.152* 
(0.010) 
-  0.205* 
(0.097) 




-  0.144* 
(0.027) 
-  0.056* 
(0.011) 
-  0.010* 
(0.003) 
-  0.004 
(0.003) 
-  0.003 
(0.01 I) 
-  0.154* 
(0.010) 
-  0.207* 
(0.097) 




-  0.134* 
(0.026) 
-  0.054* 
(0.011) 
-  0.005 
(0.003) 
















-  0.004 
(0.004) 
-  0.014* 
(0.004) 
-  0.001 
(0.017) 
-  0.094* 
(0.013) 




















-  0.501* 
(0.068) 
















-  0.608* 
(0.072) 




-  0.043* 
(0.014) 
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Per  capita  net  dissavings  (netdissau  pc)  has,  for  both  sexes,  a  significantly 
positive  effect  on  the  probability  of  non-participation.  Interpreted  in  labour 
supply  terms,  this  implies  that  leisure  is  a  normal  good.  An  increase  of  net  per 
capita  dissavings  by  1 percent  increases  the  probability  of non-participation  by 
0.9  percent  for  males  and  0.7  percent  for  females.  For  females,  both  formal  and 
informal  sector  participation  probabilities  are  negatively  affected.  For  males, 
this  only  is  the  case  for  the  formal  sector. 
Economic  activity  (econ  act)  and  the  unemployment  rate  (unemployment) 
characterise  the  individual’s  local  labour  market.  A larger  labour  market  signifi- 
cantly  increases  the  probability  that  a female  works  in  the  informal  sector,  at  the 
cost  of  non-participation.  A  high  unemployment  rate  increases  non-participa- 
tion,  for  males  and  females.  This  may  reflect  a  discouraged  worker  effect,  or,  to 
some  extent,  an  indirect  wage  effect.  For  females  in  particular,  results  suggest 
that  the  discouraged  worker  effect  in  the  formal  sector  is  substantial. 
4.3.  Specijication  tests 
The  models  are  non-nested.  In  the  (extended)  ordered  probit  model  and  the 
multinomial  logit  model,  the  number  of  slope  parameters  is  the  same.  Vuong 
(1989)  developed  a  test  for  the  null  hypothesis  that  the  two  models  are  equally 
close,  in  the  Kullback-Leibner  sense,  to  the  true  data  generating  process  against 
the  alternative  that  one  of the  models  is closer.  This  test  is quite  general,  since  it 
does  not  assume  that  either  of  the  models  represents  the  truth.4  For  males  the 
null  hypothesis  cannot  be  rejected  at  a  5  percent  level.  The  likelihood  of  the 
ordered  probit  model  is larger  than  that  of the  multinomial  logit  model,  but  the 
difference  is too  small  to  reject  equality  of expected  log  likelihoods.  For  females, 
the  null  hypothesis  is rejected  in  favour  of the  multinomial  logit  model.  For  both 
sexes,  multinomial  logit  outperforms  ordered  probit  in  the  percentage  of  cor- 
rectly  predicted  observations:  multinomial  logit  predicts  the  labour  market  state 
of 59.0 percent  of females  and  of 62.4  percent  of males  correctly.  For  the  ordered 
probit  the  percentages  are  56.1  and  59.2,  respectively.  The  special  case  of 
constant  CQ of  the  ordered  probit  model  is  clearly  rejected  by  a  likelihood 
ratio  test. 
Model  specifications  were  separately  tested  using  (generalized5)  Hausman 
specification  tests  (Hausman,  1978),  based  upon  comparison  of  (efficient)  ML 
4Performing  the  test  is easy  here,  since  we  have  strictly  non-nested  models  (Vuong,  1989,  p.  317).  We 
ignored  the  preliminary  step  of  estimating  the  dissavings  equation.  Since  estimates  of  ML  standard 
errors  which  account  for  this  preliminary  step,  are  virtually  identical  to  standard  ML  standard 
errors  ignoring  the  first  step  uncertainty,  we  do  not  think  that  this  leads  to  biased  results. 
‘The  tests  are  generalized  in  the  sense  that  we  have  no  specific  alternative  in  mind  for  which  ML  is 
inconsistent  while  the  two  step  estimator  remains  consistent.  This  may  affect  the  power,  but  does  not 
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estimates  with  (consistent  but  inefficient)  two-step  estimates.  Computational 
details  are  available  upon  request. 6 All model  specifications  are  rejected  at  the 
1 percent  level.  Given  the  large  number  of  observations  and  the  previous 
experience  in the  literature  with  these  kind  of models,  this  is no  surprise.  For 
example,  the model  of Magnac  (1991) fails to pass similar tests. The values of the 
test statistic  lead to the same conclusions  as the likelihood  values: for males, the 
ordered  probit  version  of the model  performs  better,  for females the multinomial 
logit  model. 
5.  Conclusions 
We have analyzed  earnings  and labour  market  participation  in urban  areas  of 
Bolivia  using  two  different  methods  to  model  participation.  The  first,  the 
ordered  probit  model,  explicitly  models  the  informal  sector  as a buffer  sector, 
between  non-participation  and  the  formal  sector.  The  second,  the  multinomial 
logit  model,  does  not  impose  any  ordering.  We have  compared  the  two  models 
using  estimation  results,  specification  tests  and  comparative  statics. 
We  have  generalized  the  standard  version  of  the  ordered  probit  model, 
allowing  one of the thresholds  to vary  with characteristics.  The  model  thus  gets 
the  same  flexibility  as a  multinomial  model  without  ordering.  This  generaliz- 
ation  appears  to be an improvement:  the  special  case of a constant  threshold  is 
strongly  rejected  for  both  sexes, using  e.g. likelihood  ratio  or  Wald  tests. 
The  models  are  consistent  with  a  life cycle  framework  in  the  treatment  of 
income  other  than  earnings.  Moreover,  we allow  for  endogeneity  of the  other 
income  measure,  net  dissavings.  This  appears  to  be an  improvement  also:  LM 
tests  confirm  that  endogeneity  is  significant.  Estimating  the  model  without 
allowing  for  endogeneity  yields  some  quite  different  results:  the  impact  of 
unearned  income  changes  sign, and the conclusions  about  selectivity  in the wage 
equations  change  substantially.  Allowing  for endogeneity,  we find that  leisure  is 
a normal  good:  the  income  effect  on  non-participation  is clearly  positive.  For 
males,  the  income  effect  on  formal  sector  participation  is  clearly  negative, 
whereas  it  is  insignificant  for  the  informal  sector.  For  females,  both  income 
effects  of  participation  are  significantly  negative.  Although  the  difference  be- 
tween  the  two  models  is  in  the  way  sector  participation  is  modelled,  the 
estimated  probabilities  correspond  reasonably  well,  and  depend  on  the  re- 
gressors  in a similar  way. 
6Again,  we  ignored  the  preliminary  OLS  estimation  of  the  net  dissavings  equation.  Given  the 
negligible  differences  between  uncorrected  and  corrected  ML-standard  errors,  we  do  not  think  that 
this  is  important.  Two  step  method  standard  errors  for  the  wage  equation  are  corrected  for 
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Contrary  to  Gindling  (1991)  we  find  that  accounting  for  selectivity 
substantially  affects the wage equation  estimates.  The direction  of the selectivity 
effects  is the  same  according  to  both  models.  In  the  informal  sector,  however, 
the  magnitude  of  the  selectivity  effect  substantially  depends  on  the  mode1 
which  is  chosen.  As  a  consequence,  the  two  models  lead  to  substantially 
different  predictions  of  potential  informal  sector  earnings  of  nonparticipants 
and  formal  sector  employees.  Using  specification  tests  for  non-nested  models, 
we  tend  to  prefer  the  multinomial  logit  mode1  for  females.  For  males,  we 
find  slightly  more  support  for  the  ordered  probit  model,  but  the  difference  is 
insignificant. 
A number  of  conclusions  appears  to  be  robust  with  respect  to  the  chosen 
model.  The dispersion  of potential  earnings  in the informal  sector  is much  larger 
than  in the forma1 sector  (see Fig.  1). This  is in accordance  with the  notion  that 
the  informal  sector  is  strongly  heterogeneous  (Fields,  1990). Wages  in  both 
sectors  are  higher  in larger  local  labour  markets,  and  lower  in areas  with  high 
unemployment.  In  both  sectors  also,  females  of ethnic  minorities  are  generally 
underpaid,  while  for  males  this  effect  is insignificant.  In  accordance  with  eco- 
nomic  theory,  returns  to  education  in  the  formal  sector  exceed  those  in  the 
informal  sector.  Predicted  wages  are  higher  in  the  formal  sector  for  males, 
which  supports  the  view  in  theoretical  models  (Fields,  1975)  that  formal 
sector  employment  is preferred  to informal  sector  employment,  but  that  formal 
sector  jobs  are  rationed.  For  females,  however,  the  opposite  holds.  This 
could  indicate  that  it  is  not  sufficient  to  look  at  wages  only  to  explain 
the  participation  decision  of  females.  It  may  also  indicate  relatively  more 
favourable  labour  market  conditions  for  females  in  the  informal  sector. 
The  result  is  not  in  line  with  Magnac  (1991)  who  could  not  reject  weakly 
competitive  labour  markets  for  married  woman  in Colombia.  Further  analysis 
which  disentangles  the  effects  through  rationing  and  differences  in preferences 
seems  necessary  here. 
In general,  it seems  reasonable  to conclude  that  the  impact  of most  explana- 
tory  variables  is robust  with  respect  to  the  specification  choice.  This  is not  the 
case  for  the  exact  magnitude  of selectivity  effects,  particularly  in the  informal 
sector.  Looking  at  two  models  instead  of just  one  might  then  be  a  first  step 
towards  a more  robust  view on  the  segmented  labour  market  hypothesis. 
Appendix  A: Data  source  and definition  of  formality 
The  study  is  based  on  the  1989  Bolivia  household  survey.  It  contains 
a measure  for  household  consumption  and,  for  every  family  member,  detailed 
information  on  labour  supply,  earnings,  education,  health,  fertility  and  migra- 
tion.  The  labour  section  is extensive,  with information  on occupation,  earnings, 
hours  worked  and  search  behaviour. M.  Pradhan.  A.  van  Soesr  1 Labour  Economics  2  (1995)  275-297  293 
Table  A.1 
Sample  means  by  labour  market  state  (sample  standard  deviations  of other  variables  than  dummies 
in  parentheses) 
Male  Female 
Formal  Informal  Not  Formal  Informal  Not 
working  working 




middle  technical 
higher  technical 
normal  (teacher) 
university 
other 
married  (dummy) 
ethnic 
age  (in  years) 
per  cap  net 
dissavings  ( * 10) 
hourly  earnings 
(primary  activity)h 
hours  worked  per  week 
(primary  activity) 
Number  of  observations 
0.21  0.35 
0.14  0.19 
0.29  0.30 
0.04  0.03 
0.03  0.02 
0.06  0.0 I 
0.19  0.07 
0.04  0.03 
0.19  0.85 
0.30  0.39 
35.9  39.7 
(10.7)  (11.6) 
0.01  -  0.04 
(2.20)  (1.88) 
2.39  2.58 
(4.4)  (4.5) 
49.7  52.3 
(16.8)  (19.2) 
















0.09  0.39 
0.08  0.16 
0.22  0.20 
0.09  0.03 
0.05  0.01 
0.27  0.02 
0.17  0.03 
0.03  0.16 
0.55  0.71 
0.19  0.46 
33.8  39.3 
(9.3)  (11.3) 
0.24  -  0.04 
(2.79)  (1.65) 
1.94  2.01 
(1.8)  (4.6) 
38.5  46.9 
(16.5)  (24.7) 

















Education  levels:  basic,  inter  and  medio  are  subsequent  courses  of  formal  education.  Vocational 
training  is referred  to  as  technical  and  includes  industry,  commercial  and  agriculture  training.  normal 
refers  to  training  for  teachers,  uniuersity  includes  both  public  and  private  universities.  For  males, 
a  large  percentage  of  the  other  category  is  military  training. 
yrs  incompl  educ:  if individual  did  not  complete  training:  minus  number  of  years  before  completion. 
Otherwise  equal  to  zero. 
ethnic:  dummy  variable  obtained  from  the  language  question:  if the  respondent  commonly  speaks 
another  language  than  Spanish,  the  variable  is  set  to  one. 
per  cap(ita)  net  dissauings:  family  expenditures  minus  family  earnings  divided  by  family  size. 
econ  act:  number  of  individuals  (males  and  females)  working  or  looking  for  work  in  the  same  urban 
area  in  the  (random)  sample.  It  relates  to  the  size  of  the  local  labour  market  and  may  pick  up  scale 
effects.  It  varies  between  695  for  Potosi  and  2468  for  St.  Cruz. 
unemployment:  the  local  unemployment  rate  (males  and  females  jointly).  It  varies  between  0.053  in 
Trinidad  and  0.107  in  Oruro. 
‘The  survey  collects  limited  information  on  the  secondary  activity.  Secondary  activity  hours  and 
earnings  could  not  be  computed  in  the  same  way  as  for  the  primary  job.  The  number  of people  with 
primary  and  secondary  activity  in  different  sectors  is  small:  2.5  percent  of  males  and  1 percent  of 
females.  We  therefore  ignore  the  secondary  activity  in  this  study. 294  M.  Pradhan.  A.  van Soest  /  Labour  Economics  2  (1995)  275-297 
We use subsamples  of 6349 out  of 7937 males,  and  7293 out  of 9028 females. 
From  the  original  sample,  855 males  and  864 females  were  excluded  because 
they  were  not  working  because  of  health  problems  or  because  they  attended 
full-time  education.  455 males  and  648 females  were excluded  because,  accord- 
ing to our  definition  of formal  and  informal  sector,  they  could  not  be classified. 
These  are  home  or  family  workers  and  employers.  19 males  and  9  females 
were  excluded  because  of  missing  or  implausible  information  on  earnings  or 
hours  worked.  We excluded  10 males  and  5 females  because  the education  level 
was not  reported,  9 males  and  8 females  because  reported  household  expendi- 
tures  were  extremely  different  from  reported  household  income,  226 working 
males  and  175 working  females  because  they  did  not  report  earnings,  and  14 
males  and  19  females  because  of  missing  information  on  other  household 
income. 
The data  allow  for different  definitions  of the formal  and  informal  sector.  We 
have  considered  two  definitions.  The  first  uses the  size of the  enterprise  as the 
primary  indicator  of  formality:  if this  is less than  6, the  work  is classified  as 
informal,  if it is at  least  6, the job  is formal.  However,  we follow  the  common 
approach  of classifying  independent  professionals,  such as lawyers  and  doctors, 
in the formal  sector.  Household  workers  and family workers  are left unclassified. 
The  second  definition  is  based  on  the  worker’s  status  and  corresponds  to 
Magnac  (1991): wage  workers  and  independent  professionals  are  classified  as 
formal  and  self-employed’  workers  as informal.  Others  (employers,  home  and 
family  workers)  are  left  unclassified.  The  two  definitions  lead  to  the  same 
classification  for  80 percent  of all workers  (if we include  non-classified).  Of all 
workers,  4 percent  are  employers,  and  are  therefore  not  classified  according  to 
Magnac’s  definition.  These  workers  are  deleted  from  the  sample. 
Details  on  definitions  of  explanatory  variables  and  statistics  of  the  sample 
used  for  estimation,  are  presented  in Table  A.l. 
Appendix  B: Endogeneity  of  net  savings 
In  the  standard  life cycle  model,  net  dissavings  and  the  error  terms  in  the 
labour  supply  equations  (due  to future  uncertainty  only)  are  uncorrelated.  Net 
savings  may,  however,  be endogenous  as a result  of unobserved  heterogeneity. 
We add  a reduced  form  equation  for  net  dissavings  to  account  for  this: 
netdissav  =  Q< +  u,  u -  N(O,cr’)  03.1) 
‘According  to  the  survey  an  individual  is engaged  in  self-employment  iE the  person  worked  without 
dependence  on  a  boss,  managing  his  own  economic  unit,  with  or  without  the  help  of  family  workers 
or  unpaid  apprentices,  but  without  using  more  than  two  salaried  workers. M.  Pradhan,  A.  van  Soest  1 Labour  Economics  2  (1995)  275-297  295 
Table  B.1 
OLS  results  net  dissavings  equation” 
estimate  std  err 
intercept 
other  income 





St  Cruz 
Trinidad,  Cobija 
young 
prime  female 
prime  male 
old 
age  head  01 household 
age  square 









yrs  incompl  educ 
-  284.94  136.76 
0.26  0.02 
-  19.76  48.32 
2.07  49.09 
-  130.06  53.17 
-  81.44  61.24 
53.55  59.26 
-  8.42  49.31 
-  82.44  52.61 
-  1.16  8.64 
-  17.15  11.33 
-  38.38  12.33 
-  15.55  38.38 
8.49  5.58 
-  0.03  0.06 
95.80  33.12 
26.22  28.44 
71.98  36.46 
134.85  32.78 
227.42  71.56 
289.16  81.12 
102.69  57.63 
220.36  41.16 
-  115.89  46.69 
21.91  9.56 
a Dependent  variable:  Household  net  dissavings,  per  capita.  R2: 0.03 
Here  netdissav  is per  capita  net  dissavings,  and  Q is a  vector  of household 
specific  variab1es.s  Endogeneity  arises  if u is correlated  with  the  errors  in the 
selection  model. 
In the ordered  probit  model,  we assume  that  u and  the error  E in the selection 
equation  are  bivariate  normal.  This  implies  that  the  conditional  expectation  of 
E  given  u, is  linear  in  u.  In  the  multinomial  logit  model,  we  make  a  similar 
assumption,  concerning  the  distribution  of the error  terms  pi in (3), conditional 
on  u: 
pi =  vi -  YiU  -  E I’(Z);  )?i, y12,  Fj3  independent.  (I=) 
aQj  includes  household  non-labour  income.  Since  this  is not  in the  vector  Z  of explanatory  variables 
in  the  selection  equations,  identification  of  the  model  is  guaranteed. 296  M.  Prudhan.  A.  van  Soesr  /  Lahour  Economics  2  (1995)  275-297 
Normalization  requires  y3 =  0.  If  y =  (yi,  y2) =  (O,O), the  specification  is  as 
described  in  Section  3, and  net  savings  are  exogenous. 
Both  models  can  be  consistently  estimated  if endogeneity  is  allowed  for  by 
adding  an  auxiliary  estimation  step  (cf.  Smith  and  Blundell  (1986)  for  the 
ordered  probit  case).  First,  (B.l)  is  estimated  by  OLS.  OLS  residuals  are  then 
added  to  the  regressors  of  the  selection  equation(s).  Next,  ML  or  two-step 
estimation  is  carried  out.  Testing  for  endogeneity  boils  down  to  testing  the 
significance  of the  coefficient(s)  of the  OLS  residuals.  ML-standard  errors  in  the 
second  step  are  inconsistent  in  case  of  endogeneity,  because  the  parameters  in 
(B.l)  are  replaced  by  their  estimates.  Correction  is  possible  following  Newey 
(1984). 
Preliminary  OLS-estimates  of  the  dissavings  equation  (B.l)  were  used  for 
both  models.  Results  are  mentioned  in  Table  B.l.  As  expected,  the  impact  of 
other  household  income  is  positive  and  strongly  significant. 
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